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Proof of Lemma 1.
Part (a) is obvious; hence we only provide the proof for (b). Since WQ(λ) is strictly increasing in
λ ∈ [0, µ) with WQ(0) = 0, it follows that
g(λ) = u1(λ, p)− u2(λ, p) = (w1 − w2)− (d1 − d2)WQ(λ)
is strictly decreasing in λ ∈ [0, µ) and it satisfies g(0) > 0, g(λ)→ −∞ as λ→ µ. This shows that
there exists a unique λˆ ∈ (0, µ) satisfying g(λˆ) = 0, g(λˆ) > 0 on λ < λˆ, and g(λˆ) < 0 on λ > λˆ.
Solving g(λ) = 0 with (2), we obtain (3). 2
Proof of Theorem 1.
(1) We first suppose Λ1 ≥ λ1(p). We need to prove that the following is a Nash equilibrium for the
customers: class-1 customers enter with probability λ1(p)/Λ1, and no class-2 customers enter the
system. To this end, we first assume that class-1 customers follow the said strategy, i.e., class-1
customers enter the system at rate λ1(p). Then, it follows from u2(λ1(p), p) ≤ u1(λ1(p), p) = 0 that
it is optimal for class-2 customers not to enter the system for service, since doing so can only lead to
negative utility. Next, suppose class-2 customers follow the strategy of not entering the system for
service, the utility value of the class-1 customer is u1(λ, p) (if to enter with probability λ/Λ1) and
0 (if to not enter). Note that u1(λ, p) is positive on λ < λ1(p)/Λ1 and negative on λ > λ1(p)/Λ1,
this shows that class-1 customers enter the system with probability λ1(p)/Λ1.
Next we consider λ2(p) ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ1(p). We need to show that the following is an equilibrium:
Class-1 customers enter the system but no class-2 customers enter the system. First suppose class-2
customers follow the said strategy, if class-1 customers enter the system with probability λ/Λ1 with
λ ≤ Λ1, then their utility value is u1(λ, p); and if they do not enter, then their utility value is 0.
Since u1(λ, p) is strictly decreasing in λ, we have u1(λ, p) ≥ u1(Λ1, p) > u1(λ1(p), p) = 0. This
shows that all customers will enter the system hence each class-1 customer enters with probability
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1. On the other hand, suppose that class-1 customers follow the strategy of entering the system
with probability 1, then the utility value of class-2 customers is u2(λ + Λ1, p) (if to entering with
probability λ/Λ2)) and 0 (if to not enter). Since λ2(p) is strictly decreasing in p and u2(λ, p) is
strictly decreasing in λ, it follows from Λ1 ≥ λ2(p) that
u2(λ+ Λ1, p) ≤ u2(Λ1, p) ≤ u2(λ2(p), p) = 0.
Thus, it is optimal for class-2 customers to not enter the system.
(2) Suppose Λ1 < λ2(p), we consider two subcases. First, λ2(p) < Λ1 + Λ2. We show that, in
this subcase the Nash equilibrium is that class-1 customers enter the system with probability 1 and
class-2 customers enter the system with probability (λ2(p) − Λ1)/Λ2. Suppose class-2 customers
follow this strategy, we need to prove that the class-1 customers enter the system with probability
1. Since for the dominating customers case we have λ1(p) ≥ λ2(p), it follows that when class-1
customers enter with probability 1 we have
u1((λ2(p)− Λ1) + Λ1, p) = u1(λ2(p), p) ≥ u1(λ1(p), p) = 0.
This shows that class-2 customers also enter the system with probability 1. Next, suppose class-
1 customers follow the prescribed strategy, then if customer-2 customers enter the system with
probability λ/Λ2, then by u2(λ2(p), p) = 0 we conclude that the utility value of class-2 customers
is negative when λ > λ2(p) − Λ1 and nonnegative otherwise. This shows that in this subcase the
class-2 customers enter the system with probability (λ2(p)− Λ1)/Λ2.
We finally consider the subcase that λ2(p) ≥ Λ1+Λ2. We need to show that the Nash equilibrium
for this case is that, all customers, class-1 and class-2, join the system with probability 1. Again, first
suppose class-1 customers follow this strategy, then when class-2 customers join with probability
1, their expected utility is u2(Λ, p) ≥ u2(λ2(p), p) = 0. This shows that class 2 customers join the
system as well. On the other hand, if class-2 customers follow the prescribed strategy, then the
utility value of class-1 customers when entering with probability 1 is
u1(Λ1 + Λ2, p) ≥ u1(λ2(p), p) ≥ u2(λ2(p), p) = 0.
Thus class-1 customers enter the system with probability 1 as well. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.
We only prove part (a), since part (b) can be similarly proved. Note that wi = vi − di/µ. Then,
pˆ = (v2d1 − v1d2)/(d1 − d2) = (w2d1 − w1d2)/(d1 − d2). From (3) and (4), it is easy to verify that
λˆ = λ1(pˆ) = λ2(pˆ). Since λi(p) is strictly decreasing in p, λi(p) > λˆ when p < pˆ while λi(p) < λˆ
when p > pˆ, i = 1, 2. Thus, to complete the proof for part (a), it remains to show λ1(p) < λ2(p)
when p < pˆ and λ1(p) > λ2(p) when p > pˆ. In what follows, we only prove the result when p < pˆ,
and the result when p > pˆ can be similarly proved.
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When p < pˆ, since λ2(p) > λˆ, it follows from Lemma 1 that u1(λ2(p), p) < u2(λ2(p), p). From
the definition of λi(p), we have u1(λ1(p), p) = u2(λ2(p), p) = 0. Thus, u1(λ2(p), p) < u1(λ1(p), p).
Since u1(λ, p) is strictly decreasing in λ, we obtain λ1(p) < λ2(p). The proof is complete. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.
(1) We first prove that, when Λ1 ≥ λ1(p), the Nash equilibrium is, class-1 customers enter the
system at rate λ1(p), and no class-2 customers enter the system. Since p ≥ pˆ, by Lemma 3 we
have λˆ ≥ λ1(p) ≥ λ2(p). When class-1 customers follow the said strategy, by the monotonicity of
u2(λ, p) and the definition of λ1(p) and λ2(p), if class-2 customers join the system at rate λ ≤ Λ2,
then
u2(λ1(p) + λ, p) ≤ u2(λ1(p), p) ≤ u2(λ2(p), p) = 0.
This shows that λ = 0 and no class-2 customer will enter the system. On the other hand, if
class-2 customers follow the prescribed strategy of not entering the system, then it follows from the
monotonicity of u1(λ, p) and u1(λ1(p), p) = 0 that class-1 customers enter the system at rate λ1(p).
We next prove that, when λ2(p) ≤ Λ1 < λ(p), the Nash equilibrium is, class-1 customers enter
the system at rate Λ1 and class-2 customers do not enter the system. First suppose that class-2
customers follow the said strategy. Since Λ1 < λ1(p), we have u1(Λ1, p) > u1(λ1(p), p) = 0. Hence
class-1 customers enter the system at rate Λ1. On the other hand, given that class-1 customers
follow the prescribed strategy, then from the monotonicity of u2(λ, p) in λ, we obtain u2(Λ1, p) ≤
u2(λ2(p), p) = 0. This shows that class-2 customers do not enter the system.
(2) We need to prove that, the Nash equilibrium is, class-1 customers enter the system at rate
Λ1 and class-2 customers enter at rate min{λ2(p) − Λ1,Λ2}. We consider two subcases. First,
suppose λ2(p) < Λ1 + Λ2. When class-2 customers follow the prescribed strategy of entering the
system at rate λ2(p)− Λ1, by Lemma 3 we have λ1(p) ≥ λ2(p). From the monotonicity of u1(λ, p)
we have
u1((λ2(p)− Λ1) + Λ1, p) = u1(λ2(p), p) ≥ u1(λ1(p), p) = 0.
This shows that class-1 customers enter the system at rate Λ1. On the other hand, suppose class-1
customers follow the strategy of entering the system at rate Λ1, then by u2(λ2(p), p) = 0 and the
monotonicity of u2(λ, p) in λ, we conclude that class-2 customers enter the system at rate λ2(p)−Λ1.
Now suppose λ2(p) ≥ Λ1 + Λ2. If class-2 customers follow the said strategy, then by the
monotonicity of u1(λ, p) in λ and by Lemma 3 we have λ1(p) ≥ λ2(p), thus
u1(Λ1 + Λ2, p) ≥ u1(λ2(p), p) ≥ u1(λ1(p), p) = 0.
This shows that class-1 customers enter the system at rate Λ1. On the other hand, suppose that
class-1 customers follow the prescribed strategy. Since u2(Λ1 + Λ2, p) ≥ u2(λ2(p), p) = 0, we
conclude that class-2 customers enter the system at rate Λ2.
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(3) If p < pˆ, then λˆ < λ1(p) < λ2(p) by Lemma 3. We first show that, when Λ2 ≥ λ2(p), the
Nash equilibrium is, class-1 customers do not enter the system, and class-2 customers enter the
system at rate λ2(p). First suppose class-2 customers follow the said strategy, from the monotonicity
of u1(λ, p), we have u1(λ2(p), p) < u1(λ1(p), p) = 0, this shows that class-1 customers do not enter
the system. Next, if class-1 customers do not enter the system, then it follows from u2(λ2(p), p) = 0
that class-2 customers enter the system at rate λ2(p).
We next show that, when λ1(p) ≤ Λ2 ≤ λ2(p), the Nash equilibrium is, class-1 customers do
not enter the system and class-2 customers enter the system at rate Λ2. Suppose class-1 customers
follow the said strategy. By the monotonicity of u2(λ, p) in λ, we have u2(Λ2, p) > u2(λ2(p), p) = 0,
which means that class-2 customers enter the system at rate Λ2. On the other hand, if class-2
customers follow the prescribed strategy, then it follows from u1(Λ2, p) ≤ u1(λ1(p), p) = 0 that no
class-1 customers will enter the system due to negative expected utility.
(4) We need to prove that the Nash equilibrium is, class-2 customers enter the system at rate
Λ2 and class-1 customers enter the system at rate min{Λ1, λ1(p)−Λ2}. We consider two subcases.
First, suppose Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ1(p). If class-1 customers follow the said strategy, then it follows from
λ1(p) < λ2(p) that
u2(Λ1 + Λ2, p) ≥ u2(λ1(p), p) > u2(λ2(p), p) = 0.
This implies that class-2 customers enter the system at rate Λ2. On the other hand, when class-
2 customers follow their prescribed strategy, then the expected utility of class-1 customers when
entering at rate Λ1 is u1(Λ1 + Λ2, p) ≥ u1(λ1(p), p) = 0. This shows that, class-1 customers enter
the system at rate Λ1.
Second, suppose Λ1 +Λ2 > λ1(p). If class-1 customers follow the strategy of entering the system
at rate λ1(p)− Λ2, then it follows from
u2((λ1(p)− Λ2) + Λ2) = u2(λ1(p), p) > u2(λ2(p), p) = 0
that class-2 customers enter the system at rate Λ2. Similarly, if class-2 customers follow the
prescribed strategy, then it follows from u1(λ1(p), p) = 0 and Λ1 > λ1(p)−Λ2 that class-1 customers
enter the system at rate λ1(p)−Λ2, since entering at a higher rate would result in negative utility.
This completes the proof of the theorem. 2
Proof of Proposition 1.
We prove the result by analyzing the optimal price under different optimal customer bases being
served. First, if under the optimal price p∗ only class-i customers are served, then p∗ must be no
less than p∗i . This is because for a given service price p, the actual arrival rate of class-i customers is
min{Λi, λi(p)} and the firm’s expected revenue is min{pΛi, pλi(p)} = min{pΛi, pii(p)}. As pii(p) is
strictly concave and p∗i = arg maxp≥0 pii(p), we conclude that min{pΛi, pii(p)} is strictly increasing
on p ≤ p∗i . This proves that the firm’s optimal price in this case must be at least p∗i .
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Second, if under the optimal price p∗ both classes of customers are served, then in this case
p∗ must be no less than min{p∗1, p∗2}. To prove this, first note that for a given service price p,
the actual total arrival rate of two classes of customers is min{λ1(p), λ2(p),Λ}. Since 1) the total
actual arrival rate must be less than min{λ1(p), λ2(p)} so both classes of customers are willing to
enter the system, and 2) the total actual arrival rate must be less than the total potential rate Λ,
we obtain that the firm’s expected revenue is min{pi1(p), pi2(p),Λp}. As pii(p) is a strictly concave
function and p∗i = arg maxp≥0 pii(p), the firm’s optimal price must be at least min{p∗1, p∗2}.
Because under the optimal price the firm serves either one class of customers or both classes of
customers and we have shown for both cases the optimal price is at least min{p∗1, p∗2}, the desired
result follows. 2
Proof of Lemma 5.
We first prove p∗1 > p∗2 and λ∗1 > λ∗2. From (8), we have
p∗i = wi
(
1− 1 + c
2
v√
(1 + c2v) ((1 + c
2
v) + 2µwi/di)− (1 + c2v)
)
.
For the dominating case, we have w1 ≥ w2 > 0, d1 ≤ d2, and d1 < d2 when w1 = w2. Then,
w1/d1 > w2/d2. Hence, it follows from the above expression that p
∗
1 > p
∗
2. In addition, from (7),
λ∗i = arg max
0≤λ<µ
λpi(λ) = arg max
0≤λ<µ
diλ(wi/di −WQ(λ)).
Since w1/d1 > w2/d2, it follows from the above expression that λ
∗
1 > λ
∗
2.
We next prove the remaining results in Lemma 5. Since d1 ≤ d2, it follows from Proposition 1
that p1(λ) ≥ p2(λ) and so p˜i1(λ) ≥ p˜i2(λ). Consequently, p˜i1(λ∗1) ≥ p˜i1(λ∗2) ≥ p˜i2(λ∗2); and it follows
from Lemma 4 that λ∗2 = λ∗2.
Now suppose 0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗1. By the definition of λ2(x), p˜i1(x) = p˜i2(λ2(x)). Since p˜i2(λ2(x)) ≤
p˜i1(λ2(x)), then p˜i1(x) ≤ p˜i1(λ2(x)). Since λ∗1 ≤ λ∗1 by Lemma 4 and p˜i1(x) is strictly increasing in x
when 0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗1, it follows that λ2(x) ≥ x. Thus, when 0 < x < λ∗1, we have
λ′2(x) =
p˜i′1(x)
p˜i′2(λ2(x))
≥ p˜i
′
1(x)
p˜i′2(x)
=
p1(x) + xp
′
1(x)
p2(x) + xp′2(x)
> 1,
where the first inequality is from the concavity of p˜i2(·) and λ2(x) ≥ x, and the second inequality
holds since p1(x) > p2(x) when 0 < x < λ
∗
1. Therefore, λ2(x) − x is strictly increasing in x when
0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗1. Since λ2(0) = 0, λ2(x) > x when 0 < x ≤ λ∗1; and in particular, λ2(λ∗1) > λ∗1. Note
from Lemma 4 that λ2(λ
∗
1) = λ
∗
2. Then, λ
∗
2 > λ
∗
1. The proof is complete. 2
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Proof of Theorem 3.
By Theorem 1, the equilibrium total arrival rate λ(p) to the service firm can be written as
λ(p) = max {min{Λ1, λ1(p)},min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ2(p)}} .
Hence, the firm’s revenue function pi(p) = pλ(p) is
pi(p) = max {min{Λ1p, pi1(p)},min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi2(p)}} . (10)
Since pii(p) is strictly increasing in p when p ≤ p∗i , i = 1, 2, it follows that
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max
{
max
p≥0
{min{Λ1p, pi1(p)}} ,max
p≥0
{min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi2(p)}}
}
= max
{
max
p≥p∗1
{min{Λ1p, pi1(p)}} ,max
p≥p∗2
{min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi2(p)}}
}
.
Note that Λ1p is increasing in p and pi1(p) is strictly decreasing in p when p ≥ p∗1. Then, when
Λ1 ≥ λ∗1, maxp≥p∗1 {min{Λ1p, pi1(p)}} = pi1(p∗1) = p∗1λ∗1; and when Λ1 ≤ λ∗1, min{Λ1p, pi1(p)} achieves
maximum at Λ1 = pi1(p), or equivalently, at p = p1(Λ1). By the definition of p˜i1(λ), we have
max
p≥p∗1
{min{Λ1p, pi1(p)}} = p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1}).
Similarly,
max
p≥p∗2
{min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi2(p)}} = p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗2}).
Hence,
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max {p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1}), p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗2})} . (11)
In addition, it can be easily verified from the above procedure that: 1) p∗ = p∗1 if maxp≥0 pi(p) =
p˜i1(λ
∗
1); 2) p
∗ = p1(Λ1) if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(Λ1); 3) p∗ = p∗2 if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(λ∗2); and p∗ =
p2(Λ1 + Λ2) if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2).
Now we are ready to prove the theorem case by case. Note that by Lemma 2, p˜i1(λ
∗
1) ≥ p˜i2(λ∗2)
for the dominating customers case.
First, suppose Λ1 ≥ λ∗1. Then, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(λ∗1) by (11). Thus, the optimal price is p∗1.
Second, suppose either λ∗1 ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 or Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 and Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ2(Λ1) are true. In both cases,
by (11), we have
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max {p˜i1(Λ1), p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗2})} .
When λ∗1 ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1, from the definition of λ∗1, p˜i1(Λ1) ≥ p˜i2(λ∗1) = pi2(p∗2). When 0 ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 and
Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ2(Λ1), it follows from Lemma 4 that Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ∗2. Then, p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗2}) =
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p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2) ≤ p˜i2(λ2(Λ1)) = p˜i1(Λ1). Thus, for both cases, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(Λ1), and the optimal
price is p1(Λ1).
Third, suppose 0 ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 and Λ1 + Λ2 ≥ λ∗2. In this case, since λ∗1 ≤ λ∗1, we have
p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1}) = p˜i1(Λ1) ≤ p˜i1(λ1) = p˜i2(λ∗2) = p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗2}).
Then, by (11), maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(λ∗2). Thus, the optimal price is p∗2.
Finally, suppose 0 ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 and λ2(Λ1) ≤ Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ∗2. In this case, we have
p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1}) = p˜i1(Λ1) = p˜i2(λ2(Λ1)) ≤ p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2) = p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗2}).
Then, by (11), maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2). Consequently, the optimal price is p2(Λ).
Summarizing the above different cases and applying Theorem 1, we obtain Theorem 3. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.
1) According to Lemma 1, it is easily seen that pi1(p
∗
1) > pi2(p
∗
2). By the definition of λ
∗
1 and λ2(Λ1),
it follows that
R(I) = pi1(p
∗
1) > pi1(p1(Λ1)) = R
(II) > pi2(p
∗
2) = R
(III) > pi2(p2(Λ1 + Λ2)) = R
(IV ).
2) By the definition of λ∗1, it follows that λ
∗
1 ≤ λ∗1. Note that p˜i1(λ) is strictly increasing in λ
when 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ∗1. Then,
R(III) = pi2(p
∗
2) = p˜i2(λ
∗
2) = p˜i1(λ
∗
1) > p˜i1(Λ1) = pi1(p1(Λ1)) = R
(V ).
The proof is complete. 2
Proof of Lemma 6.
We only prove pˆ ≥ p∗2 if pˆ ≥ p∗1, and the result that pˆ ≤ p∗1 if pˆ ≤ p∗2 can be proved similarly.
Suppose pˆ ≥ p∗1. Then, pi1(p) is strictly decreasing in p when p ≥ pˆ, and thus pi1(p) ≤ pi1(pˆ) for any
p ≥ pˆ. In addition, from Lemma 3, pi1(pˆ) = pi2(pˆ) and λ1(p) ≥ λ2(p) for any p ≥ pˆ. It follows that
pi2(p) ≤ pi2(pˆ) for any p ≥ pˆ. Thus, by the definition of p∗2, we obtain p∗2 ≤ pˆ.
(a) Suppose pˆ ≤ min{p∗1, p∗2}. In this case, λˆ ≥ max{λ∗1, λ∗2}, and from Lemma 3, p∗1λ∗1 =
pi1(p
∗
1) ≥ pi1(p∗2) ≥ pi2(p∗2) = p∗2λ∗2. Thus, by Lemma 4, λ∗2 = λ∗2. Now suppose 0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗1. By the
definition of λ2(x), p˜i1(x) = p˜i2(λ2(x)). Since λ2(x) ≤ λ∗2 ≤ λˆ by Lemma 4, it follows from Lemma
3 that p˜i2(λ2(x)) ≤ p˜i1(λ2(x)), and then, p˜i1(λ2(x)) ≥ p˜i1(x). Since λ∗1 ≤ λ∗1 by Lemma 4 and p˜i1(x)
is strictly increasing in x when 0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗1, it follows that λ2(x) ≥ x. In particular, λ2(λ∗1) ≥ λ∗1.
Note from Lemma 4 that λ2(λ
∗
1) = λ
∗
2. Then, λ
∗
2 ≥ λ∗1.
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(b) Suppose pˆ ≥ max{p∗1, p∗2}. In this case, λˆ ≤ min{λ∗1, λ∗2}, and from Lemma 3, pi2(p∗2) ≥
pi2(p
∗
1) ≥ pi1(p∗1). Thus, by Lemma 4, λ∗1 = λ∗1. Since p˜i1(λˆ) = p˜i2(λˆ), it is easily seen from the
definition of λi(x) that λˆ = λ1(λˆ) = λ2(λˆ). Since λ2(x) is increasing in x by Lemma 4, then
λ2(λˆ) ≤ λ2(λ∗1) = λ∗2 and λ2(x) ≤ λ2(λˆ) = λˆ when 0 ≤ x ≤ λˆ. In addition, when 0 ≤ x ≤ λˆ, we
have p˜i2(λ2(x)) = p˜i1(x) ≥ p˜i2(x) by Lemma 3, since p˜i2(x) is increasing in x when 0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗2, it
follows that λ2(x) ≥ x. Now assume λˆ ≤ x ≤ λ∗2. Then, p˜i1(λ1(x)) = p˜i2(x) ≥ p˜i1(x) by Lemma 3.
Since p˜i1(x) is strictly increasing in x when 0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗1, it follows that λ1(x) ≥ x. In particular,
λ1(λ
∗
2) ≥ λ∗2. Note from Lemma 4 that λ1(λ∗2) = λ∗1. Then, λ∗1 ≥ λ∗2.
(c) Suppose p∗2 < pˆ < p∗1. In this case, λ∗1 < λˆ < λ∗2. Note from Lemma 4 that 0 ≤ λ∗2 ≤ λ∗2 and
p˜i2(λ
∗
2) = min{p˜i1(λ∗1), p˜i2(λ∗2)} > p˜i2(λˆ). Then, since p˜i2(λ) is strictly increasing in λ when 0 ≤ λ ≤
λ∗2, we obtain λˆ < λ
∗
2 ≤ λ∗2. In addition, it follows from Lemma 4 that λ1(λˆ) < λ1(λ∗2) = λ∗1 ≤ λ∗1.
Now assume 0 ≤ x ≤ λ1(λˆ). Then, 0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗1 < λˆ and so p˜i2(λ2(x)) = p˜i1(x) > p˜i2(x) by Lemma
3. Since p˜i2(x) is strictly increasing in x when 0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗2, it follows that λ2(x) ≥ x. In addition,
from Lemma 4, λ2(λ1(λˆ)) = λˆ, so λ2(x) ≤ λˆ when 0 ≤ x ≤ λ1(λˆ). The proof is complete. 2
For completeness, we present the optimal pricing decision for all the non-dominating customer
case altogether in the following Theorem.
Theorem 5. (Optimal price for non-dominating customer case) When d1 > d2, the optimal price
of the firm pEQ and customers’ equilibrium behavior (θEQ1 , θ
EQ
2 ) are given in four exclusive regions
of the system parameters as follows:
Case 1: pˆ ≤ min{p∗1, p∗2}. In this case, the optimal pricing strategy of the firm is given exactly in
the same way as that in Theorem 3, and it is illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Optimal policy when pˆ ≥ max{p∗1, p∗2}
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Case 2. pˆ ≥ max{p∗1, p∗2}. In this case, the optimal pricing strategy of the firm is given according
to the following subcases, and it is illustrated in Figure 5:
(2-1) if Λ2 ≥ λ∗2, then pEQ = max{p∗2, p2(Λ2)} and (θEQ1 , θEQ2 ) = (0,min{1, λ∗2/Λ2});
(2-2) if Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 and Λ1 + Λ2 ≥ max{λˆ, λ1(Λ2)}, then pEQ = max{p∗1, p1(Λ1 + Λ2)} and
(θEQ1 , θ
EQ
2 ) = (min{1, (λ∗1 − Λ2)/Λ1}, 1);
(2-3) if λˆ ≤ Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 and Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ1(Λ2), then pEQ = p2(Λ2) and (θEQ1 , θEQ2 ) = (0, 1);
(2-4) if λ2(Λ1) ≤ Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λˆ, then pEQ = p2(Λ1 + Λ2) and (θEQ1 , θEQ2 ) = (1, 1);
(2-5) if Λ1 ≤ λˆ and Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ2(Λ1), then pEQ = p1(Λ1) and (θEQ1 , θEQ2 ) = (1, 0).
Figure 5: Optimal policy when pˆ ≥ max{p∗1, p∗2}
Case 3. p∗2 < pˆ < p∗1 and p∗1λ∗1 ≥ p∗2λ∗2. In this case the optimal pricing strategy of the firm is given
according to the following subcases, and it is illustrated in Figure 6:
(3-1) if Λ1 ≥ λ∗1, then pEQ = max{p∗1, p1(Λ1)}, and (θEQ1 , θEQ2 ) = (min{1, λ∗1/Λ1}, 0);
(3-2) if Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 and Λ2 ≥ max{λˆ, λ2(Λ1)}, then pEQ = max{p∗2, p2(Λ2)} and
(θEQ1 , θ
EQ
2 ) = (0,min{1, λ∗2/Λ2});
(3-3) if λ1(λˆ) ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 and Λ2 ≤ λ2(Λ1), or Λ1 ≤ λ1(λˆ), Λ2 ≤ λˆ and Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ2(Λ1), then
pEQ = p1(Λ1) and (θ
EQ
1 , θ
EQ
2 ) = (1, 0);
(3-4) if Λ1 ≤ λ1(λˆ), Λ2 ≤ λˆ and Λ1 + Λ2 ≥ λˆ, then pEQ = pˆ and any (θEQ1 , θEQ2 ) in the following
set is an equilibrium: {(θ1, θ2) : 0 ≤ θ1, θ2 ≤ 1, θ1Λ1 + θ2Λ2 = λˆ};
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Figure 6: Optimal policy when p∗2 < pˆ < p∗1 and p∗2λ∗2 ≤ p∗1λ∗1
(3-5) if Λ1 ≤ λ1(λˆ) and λ2(Λ1) ≤ Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λˆ, then pEQ = p2(Λ1 + Λ2) and (θEQ1 , θEQ2 ) = (1, 1).
Note that for clarity, in Figure 6 we have displayed Subcase (3-1) in regions (I) and (II) ac-
cording to Λ1 ≥ λ∗1 and Λ1 ≤ λ∗1, respectively. Similarly, we have displayed Subcase (3-2) in regions
(III) and (IV) and Subcase (3-4) in regions (IV) and (VIII).
Case 4. p∗2 < pˆ < p∗1 and p∗1λ∗1 < p∗2λ∗2. In this case, the optimal pricing strategy is given according
to the following subcases, and it is illustrated in Figure 7:
(4-1) if Λ2 ≥ λ∗2, then pEQ = max{p∗2, p2(Λ2)} and (θEQ1 , θEQ2 ) = (0,min{1, λ∗2/Λ2});
(4-2) if Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 and Λ1 ≥ λ∗1, then pEQ = p∗1 and (θEQ1 , θEQ2 ) = (λ∗1/Λ1, 0);
(4-3) if Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 and Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 = λ∗1, then this subcase can be further decomposed into five regions
(IV) to (VIII) in exactly the same way as that in Case 3, and the optimal price in each region
is also the same as that in the respective region in Case 3.
Proof of Theorems 4 and 5.
In the following proof. We only prove the results on the optimal price. Based on these results, the
customers’ equilibrium joining probabilities can be obtained straightforwardly via Theorem 2.
By Theorem 2, it can be seen that the firm’s equilibrium total arrival rate λ(p) can be written
as
λ(p) =
{
max {min{Λ2, λ2(p)},min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ1(p)}} , 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ;
max {min{Λ1, λ1(p)},min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ2(p)}} , p ≥ pˆ.
34
Figure 7: Optimal policy when p∗2 < pˆ < p∗1 and p∗2λ∗2 ≥ p∗1λ∗1
Hence, the firm’s revenue function pi(p) = pλ(p) can be written as
pi(p) =
{
max {min{Λ2p, pi2(p)},min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi1(p)}} , 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ;
max {min{Λ1p, pi1(p)},min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi2(p)}} , p ≥ pˆ.
(12)
Case 1. Suppose pˆ ≤ min{p∗1, p∗2}. In this case, pi1(p) and pi2(p) are both increasing in p when
0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ. Thus, it follows from (12) that maxp≥0 pi(p) = maxp≥pˆ pi(p). Notice that the objective
function pi(p) in (12) when p ≥ pˆ is exactly the same as that in (10) for the dominating customers
case. In addition, by Lemma 6, Lemma 5 continues to hold and p˜i1(λ
∗
1) ≥ p˜i2(λ∗2). Therefore,
following the same arguments as those in the proof of Theorem 3, we can show that the firm’s
optimal pricing strategy for Case 1 is exactly the same as that in Theorem 3.
Case 2. Suppose pˆ ≥ max{p∗1, p∗2}. In this case, pi1(p) and pi2(p) are both decreasing in p when
p ≥ pˆ. By Lemma 3, min{λ∗1, λ∗2} ≥ λˆ = λ1(pˆ) = λ2(pˆ). Then, pi(pˆ) = min{Λ1 + Λ2, λˆ}pˆ. In what
follows, we divide the analysis into two subcases: 1) Λ1 + Λ2 ≥ λˆ; and 2) Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λˆ.
We first consider Λ1+Λ2 ≥ λˆ. In this subcase, pi(pˆ) = pˆλˆ. When p ≥ pˆ, we have min{Λ1p, pi1(p)} ≤
pi1(p) ≤ pi1(pˆ) = pi(pˆ) and min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi2(p)} ≤ pi2(pˆ) = pi(pˆ). Then, by (12), maxp≥0 pi(p) =
max0≤p≤pˆ pi(p). Thus,
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max
{
max
0≤p≤pˆ
{min{Λ2p, pi2(p)}}, max
0≤p≤pˆ
{min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi1(p)}}
}
= max
{
max
p∗2≤p≤pˆ
{min{Λ2p, pi2(p)}}, max
p∗1≤p≤pˆ
{min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi1(p)}}
}
.
Note that Λ2p is increasing in p and pi2(p) is strictly decreasing in p when p ≥ p∗2. Then, when Λ2 ≥
λ∗2, we have maxp∗2≤p≤pˆ {min{Λ2p, pi2(p)}} = pi2(p∗2) = p∗2λ∗2; and when Λ2 ≤ λ∗2, min{Λ2p, pi2(p)}
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achieves maximum over p∗2 ≤ p ≤ pˆ at p = min{p2(Λ2), pˆ} = p2(max{Λ2, λˆ}). Thus, by the
definition of p˜i2(λ), we have
max
p∗2≤p≤pˆ
{min{Λ2p, pi2(p)}} = Λ2max{Λ2,λˆ} p˜i2(min{max{Λ2, λˆ}, λ
∗
2}).
Similarly and by noting that Λ1 + Λ2 ≥ λˆ, we obtain
max
p∗1≤p≤pˆ
{min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi1(p)}} = p˜i1(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗1}).
Hence,
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max
{
Λ2
max{Λ2,λˆ} p˜i2(min{max{Λ2, λˆ}, λ
∗
2}), p˜i1(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗1})
}
. (13)
It can be easily verified from the above procedure that: 1) p∗ = p∗1 if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(λ∗1); 2)
p∗ = p1(Λ1+Λ2) if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(Λ1+Λ2); 3) p∗ = p∗2 if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(λ∗2); and p∗ = p2(Λ2)
if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(Λ2).
We are now ready to prove (2-1) to (2-3). Note that by Lemma 2, p˜i1(λ
∗
1) ≤ p˜i2(λ∗2) for Case 2.
We first prove (2-1) and (2-3). When Λ2 ≥ λ∗2, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(λ∗2) by (13). Thus, the optimal
price is p∗2 when Λ2 ≥ λ∗2. Now suppose either λ∗2 ≤ Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 or λˆ ≤ Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 and Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ1(Λ2).
In both cases, by (13), we have
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max {p˜i2(Λ2), p˜i1(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗1})} .
When λ∗2 ≤ Λ2 ≤ λ∗2, from the definition of λ∗2, p˜i2(Λ2) ≥ p˜i2(λ∗2) = pi1(p∗1). When λˆ ≤ Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 and
Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ1(Λ2), it follows from Lemma 6 that Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ∗1. Then, p˜i1(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗1}) =
p˜i1(Λ1 + Λ2) ≤ p˜i1(λ1(Λ2)) = p˜i2(Λ2). Thus, for both cases, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(Λ2), and the optimal
price is p2(Λ2).
We next prove (2-2). First suppose Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 and Λ1 + Λ2 ≥ λ∗1. In this case, since λˆ ≤ λ∗2 ≤ λ∗2,
we have
p˜i2(min{max{Λ2, λˆ}, λ∗2}) = p˜i2(max{Λ2, λˆ}) ≤ p˜i2(λ∗2) = p˜i1(λ∗1) = p˜i1(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λ∗1}).
Then, by (13), maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(λ∗1). Thus, the optimal price p∗1.
We next suppose Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 and max{λˆ, λ1(Λ2)} ≤ Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ∗1. In this case, by (13),
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max
{
Λ2
max{Λ2,λˆ} p˜i2(max{Λ2, λˆ}), p˜i1(Λ1 + Λ2})
}
.
When λˆ ≤ λ1(Λ2), from the definition of λ1(Λ2), we have
p˜i2(Λ2) = p˜i1(λ1(Λ2)) ≤ p˜i1(Λ1 + Λ2).
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When λˆ > λ1(Λ2), since Λ2 ≤ λˆ ≤ Λ1 + Λ2, then p˜i1(Λ1 + Λ2) ≥ p˜i1(λˆ) = p˜i2(λˆ) ≥ p˜i2(Λ2). Thus, for
both cases, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(Λ1 + Λ2), and the optimal price is p1(Λ1 + Λ2).
We next consider Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λˆ. In this subcase, when 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ, since λ1(p) and λ2(p) are
decreasing in p by Lemma 2, it follows that
Λ2p ≤ λˆp = λ2(pˆ)p ≤ λ2(p)p = pi2(p);
(Λ1 + Λ2)p ≤ λˆp = λ1(pˆ)p ≤ λ1(p)p = pi1(p).
Then, by (12), pi(p) = (Λ1 + Λ2)p is increasing in p when 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ. Therefore, maxp≥0 pi(p) =
maxp≥pˆ pi(p). In addition, since Λ1pˆ ≤ pi1(pˆ), (Λ1+λ2)pˆ ≤ pi2(pˆ), and pi1(p) and pi2(p) are decreasing
in p when p ≥ pˆ, it is straightforward to verify from (12) that
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max{p˜i1(Λ1), p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2)}.
Now we are ready to prove (2-4) and (2-5). When λ2(Λ1) ≤ Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λˆ, we have p˜i1(Λ1) =
p˜i2(λ2(Λ1)) ≤ p˜i2(Λ1+Λ2) by the definition of λ2(Λ1) and the monotonicity of p˜i2(x) over 0 ≤ x ≤ λ∗2;
then maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2) and the optimal price is p2(Λ1 + Λ2). On the other hand, when
Λ1 ≤ λˆ and Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λ2(Λ1), we have Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λˆ by Lemma 6; and it is easy to verify that
maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(Λ1) and the optimal price is p1(Λ1). The proof for Case 2 is complete.
Case 3. Suppose p∗2 < pˆ < p∗1. Then, λ∗1 < λˆ < λ∗2 by Lemma 3. In this case, pi1(p) is increasing in
p when 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ, and pi2(p) is decreasing in p when p ≥ pˆ. Then, by (12), we have
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max
{
max
p∗2≤p≤pˆ
{min{Λ2p, pi2(p)}}, min{Λ1 + Λ2, λˆ}pˆ,
max
p≥p∗1
{min{Λ1p, pi1(p)}}, max
p≥pˆ
{min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi2(p)}}
}
. (14)
By similar arguments as those in the above proofs for Case 1 (or Theorem 3) and Case 2, it is easy
to show that
max
p∗2≤p≤pˆ
{min{Λ2p, pi2(p)}} = Λ2max{Λ2,λˆ} p˜i2(min{max{Λ2, λˆ}, λ
∗
2});
max
p≥p∗1
{min{Λ1p, pi1(p)}} = p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1});
max
p≥pˆ
{min{(Λ1 + Λ2)p, pi2(p)}} = p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λˆ}).
Substituting above identities into (14) and noting that p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λˆ}) ≥ min{Λ1 + Λ2, λˆ}pˆ,
we obtain
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max
{
Λ2
max{Λ2,λˆ} p˜i2(min{max{Λ2, λˆ}, λ
∗
2}),
p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1}), p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λˆ})
}
. (15)
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From the above procedure, it can be easily shown that: 1) p∗ = p∗1 if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(λ∗1);
2) p∗ = p1(Λ1) if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(Λ1); 3) p∗ = p∗2 if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(λ∗2); 4) p∗ = p2(Λ2) if
maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(Λ2); 5) p∗ = pˆ if maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(λˆ); and 6) p∗ = p2(Λ1 + Λ2) if maxp≥0 pi(p) =
p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2).
Now we are ready to prove the results for Case 3. Note that p˜i1(λ
∗
1) ≥ p˜i2(λ∗2) in Case 3.
(3-1) When Λ1 ≥ λ∗1, then maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(λ∗1) by (15). Thus, the optimal price is p∗1 when
Λ1 ≥ λ∗1. Now suppose λ∗1 ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1. Then, from the definition of λ∗1, p˜i1(Λ1) ≥ p˜i2(λ∗1) = pi2(p∗2).
Thus, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(Λ1) by (15), and the optimal price is p1(Λ1).
(3-2) First suppose 0 ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 and Λ2 ≥ λ∗2. In this case, since λ∗1 ≤ λ∗1, we have
p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1}) = p˜i1(Λ1) ≤ p˜i1(λ1) = p˜i2(λ∗2) = p˜i2(min{Λ2, λ∗2}).
Then, by (15), maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(λ∗2). Thus, the optimal price is p∗2.
Now suppose λ1(λˆ) ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 and λ2(Λ1) ≤ Λ2 ≤ λ∗2, or, Λ1 ≤ λ1(λˆ) and λˆ ≤ Λ2 ≤ λ∗2. In
both subcases, λˆ ≤ Λ2 ≤ λ∗2 and Λ1 ≤ Λ∗1 by Lemma 6. Then, by (15), we have
max
p≥0
pi(p) = max
{
p˜i2(Λ2), p˜i1(Λ1)
}
.
For the first case, by the definition of λ2(Λ1), p˜i1(Λ1) = p˜i2(λ2(Λ1)) ≤ pi2(Λ2); and for the second
case, p˜i1(Λ1) ≤ p˜i1(λ1(λˆ)) = pi2(λˆ) ≤ pi2(Λ2). Thus, for both cases, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(Λ2), and the
optimal price is p2(Λ2).
(3-3) Suppose λ1(λˆ) ≤ Λ1 ≤ λ∗1 and Λ2 ≤ λ2(Λ1), or, Λ1 ≤ λ1(λˆ), Λ2 ≤ λˆ and Λ1 +Λ2 ≤ λ2(Λ1).
For both cases, p˜i2(min{max{Λ2, λˆ},Λ∗2}) = p˜i2(max{Λ2, λˆ}) and p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1}) = p˜i1(Λ1) by
Lemma 6. In addition, for the first case, since λ2(Λ1) ≥ λˆ by Lemma 6, we have
p˜i1(Λ1) = p˜i2(λ2(Λ1)) ≥ p˜i2(max{Λ2, λˆ}) ≥ p˜i2(λˆ) ≥ p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λˆ}).
For the second case, since Λ2 + Λ2 ≤ λˆ by Lemma 6, it holds that
p˜i1(Λ1) = p˜i2(λ2(Λ1)) ≥ p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λˆ}) ≥ (Λ1 + Λ2)pˆ ≥ Λ2max{Λ2,λˆ} p˜i2(λˆ).
Thus, for both cases, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i1(Λ1) by (15), and the optimal price is p1(Λ1).
(3-4) Suppose Λ1 ≤ λ1(λˆ) and Λ2 ≤ λˆ ≤ Λ1 + Λ2. Then, by the definition of λ1(λˆ), we have
p˜i2(λˆ) = p˜i1(λ1(λˆ)) ≥ p˜i1(Λ1) = p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1}) and
Λ2
max{Λ2,λˆ} p˜i2(min{max{Λ2, λˆ}, λ
∗
2}) = Λ2λˆ p˜i2(λˆ) ≤ p˜i2(λˆ) = p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ1, λˆ}).
Thus, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(λˆ) by (15), and the optimal price is pˆ.
(3-5) Suppose Λ1 ≤ λ1(λˆ) and λ2(Λ1) ≤ Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ λˆ. In this case, by the definition of λ2(Λ1)
and Lemma 6, we have
p˜i2(min{Λ1 + Λ2, λˆ}) = p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2) ≥ p˜i2(λ2(Λ1)) = p˜i1(Λ1) = p˜i1(min{Λ1, λ∗1})
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and
Λ2
max{Λ2,λˆ} p˜i2(min{max{Λ2, λˆ}, λ
∗
2}) = Λ2pˆ ≤ (Λ1 + Λ2)pˆ ≤ p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2).
Thus, maxp≥0 pi(p) = p˜i2(Λ1 + Λ2) by (15), and the optimal price is p2(Λ1 + Λ2).
Case 4. The proof of this case is essentially the same as that of Case 3, hence it is omitted. 2
For the comparison of the optimal revenues, we also report the different cases together in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. a) The firm’s optimal revenues in different regions of Case 2 in Theorem 5 satisfy
a-1) R(I) > R(II) > R(III) > R(k) > R(V I); and
a-2) R(k) > R(V II), k = IV, V .
b) The firm’s optimal revenues in different regions of Cases 3 and 4 in Theorem 5 satisfy
b-1) R(I) > R(II) > R(III) > R(k) > R(V I) > R(V II), k = IV, V ; and
b-2) R(V I) > R(V III).
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4.
a) When pˆ ≥ max{p∗1, p∗2}, by Lemma 6, we have λˆ ≤ λ∗2 ≤ λ∗1. Since p˜i1(·) and p˜i2(·) are strictly
concave functions and by the definition of λ∗2, it follows that
R(V I) < p˜i1(λˆ) < R
(IV ) < p˜i1(λ
∗
1) = R
(III) = p˜i2(λ
∗
2) < R
(II) < p˜i2(λ
∗
2) = R
(I),
and R(V II) < p˜i2(λˆ) < R
(V ) < p˜i2(λ
∗
2) = R
(III). Furthermore, from the definition of λˆ and Lemma
6, we have p˜i1(λˆ) = p˜i2(λˆ). Summarizing these results, we obtain a).
b) Suppose p∗2 < pˆ < p∗1 and p∗2λ∗2 ≤ p∗1λ∗1. By Lemma 6, λˆ ≤ λ∗2 and λ1(λˆ) < λ∗1 ≤ λ∗1. Since
p˜i1(·) and p˜i2(·) are strictly concave functions and by the definition of λ∗1, it follows that
R(V II) < R(V I) = p˜i2(λˆ) < R
(IV ) < p˜i2(λ
∗
2) = R
(III) = p˜i1(λ
∗
1) < R
(II) < p˜i1(λ
∗
1) = R
(I),
and R(V III) < p˜i1(λ1(λˆ)) < R
(V ) < p˜i1(λ
∗
1). By the definition of λˆ and λ1(·), we have p˜i1(λ1(λˆ)) =
p˜i2(λˆ). Summarizing these results, we obtain the results for Case 3.
The proof of the results for Case 4 is similar to those of Case 3, hence it is omitted. 2
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